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Abstract
This paper presents a model of nation formation in which culturally heteroge-
neous agents vote on the optimal level of public spending. Larger nations beneÞt
from increasing returns in the provision of public goods, but bear the costs of greater
cultural heterogeneity. This tradeoff induces agents preferences over different geo-
graphical conÞgurations, thus determining the likelihood of secession and uniÞcation.
We provide empirical support for choosing genetic distances as a proxy of cultural
heterogeneity. By using data on genetic distances, we examine the stability of the
current map of Europe and identify the regions prone to secession and the countries
that are more likely to merge. Our framework is further applied to estimate the
welfare gains from European Union membership.
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1 Introduction
Recent decades have witnessed large-scale map redrawing. Some countries, such as
the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, have broken up, while others have been moving to
ever closer cooperation, the European Union being the prime example. An extensive
theoretical literature has analyzed the costs and beneÞts of nation formation (see, e.g.,
Alesina and Spolaore, (1997), (2003), Bolton and Roland (1997)). Larger nations beneÞt
from scale economies, but pay the costs of an increasingly heterogeneous population. The
optimal size of a nation is then determined by this trade-off.
The main goal of this paper is to explore nation formation empirically. Focusing
on European countries and regions, we use data on cultural heterogeneity to address the
following questions. Is the current map of Europe stable? Which regions are more likely
to secede? Which countries stand a better chance to cooperate and possibly unite? Who
gains and who loses from the formation of the European Union?
The theoretical setup has agents vote on the optimal level of public spending
in presence of increasing returns in the provision of public goods. However, the utility
derived from public goods is decreasing in the countrys degree of cultural heterogeneity.
This framework allows us to compare welfare across different geographical arrangements.
In particular, we can study whether agents would like to unite or secede by assuming that
the majority of agents affected by such a move should support the rearrangement. To
model cultural heterogeneity, we rely on a matrix of cultural distances between nations.
We refer to this measure as metric heterogeneity. Preferences are such that, all else equal,
an agent prefers to be part of a nation which minimizes cultural distances. In other words,
each agent ranks nations on the basis of how culturally different they are. The notion
of metric heterogeneity we employ is similar to the one described in the literature on
cooperative games where players are characterized by their location in a network or in a
geographical space. In such a framework the gains from cooperation increase when the
distances among the players in the coalition decrease. Le Breton and Weber (1995) focus
on the case where two-person coalitions may form and characterize the patterns for which
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there is a stable group structure. In contrast to their work, we do not allow for unlimited
monetary lump sum transfers among players in the group.
The most crucial issue in linking our model to the data is how to measure cultural
heterogeneity empirically. We use genetic distances amongst populations as a proxy
for cultural distances.1 The underlying assumption is that the more two populations
have mixed, the more similar their cultural views will be. Since populations that have
experienced more mixing  or populations that have become separated more recently
 are genetically more alike, there should be a positive correlation between genetic and
cultural distances. We emphasize that we view genetic distances as a record of mixing,
and not as saying anything about the relation between genes and human behavior.
We start by estimating the set of parameter values that makes the current map
of European nations stable. In other words, we search for those parameter values that
are consistent with an equilibrium of the coalition formation game played by countries
and regions. This then allows us to determine which regions are more likely to separate,
and which countries are more likely to form a union. By slightly increasing the perceived
cost of cultural heterogeneity in the utility function, we can check which region would
be the Þrst to break away. According to our Þndings, the Basque Country is the most
likely to secede. Likewise, by slightly decreasing the cost of cultural heterogeneity, we
can see which countries would be the Þrst to unite. Belgium and Austria, two small
countries that for part of their history were united under Habsburg rule, top the list. If
we limit unions to countries that are geographically close, Denmark and Norway, which
were united from the Middle Ages until 1814, become the most likely to merge.
We also examine the gains from European Union membership. The goal is to
understand who gains most and who loses most from European Union membership. The
focus is on the EU before enlargement. Depending on the methodology used, Ireland or
Portugal come out as the winners, whereas Germany always comes in last, being the only
country that loses from being part of the EU. Of course, these Þndings are not only the
1See Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2005) and Spolaore and Wacziarg (2006) for applications of genetic
distances to economics.
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result of cultural heterogeneity. A countrys size and level of development also matter.
Larger countries already reap much of the beneÞts from increasing returns, whereas richer
countries may be loath to have to redistribute more when joining in a union with poorer
bedfellows. To isolate the role of culture, we compare our ranking to the one we would
obtain if we were not to take into account cultural heterogeneity. Two countries stand
out when ignoring culture: Belgium gains less and Greece gains more. This makes sense.
In our data set Greece is the country which is culturally most distant from the rest of the
EU-15, whereas Belgium is the genetic capital of the Union.
Before proceeding with our analysis, we would like to point out that the genetic
distances we use are imbedded in an abstract n-dimensional space. Since the values
of genetic distances are based on information of many different genes, they cannot be
represented in a one-dimensional space. In other words, we cannot locate the countries
and regions in our data set on a line.2 Although there may be certain policy issues for
which a one-dimensional space suffices, in general this is too restrictive. To give a simple
example, if agents who reside in the same county have to decide on the geographic location
of a public facility, this problem is, by nature, two-dimensional. Alternatively, agents with
the same income may have different views regarding the desired level of redistribution
within the society. Thus, the search for an optimal public policy is naturally a multi-
dimensional problem. To be consistent with this possibility, and in contrast to much of
the standard theoretical work (see, e.g., Alesina and Spolaore, (1997, 2003) and Bolton
and Roland (1997)), our model does not require a population heterogeneity to be one-
dimensional. In fact, the dimensionality of the space in which cultural distances are
measured is irrelevant.
Another important issue is to justify our choice of using genetic distances as a
proxy for cultural distances. If we are interested in measuring cultural heterogeneity, one
may argue we should use data from social surveys which enquire about peoples values.
However, the answers to many questions in opinion polls are arguably biased by short term
2Environments where the heterogeneity parameter is one dimensional have been widely investigated
(Alesina and Spolaore, 1997; Le Breton and Weber, 2003). Group stability has been explored there from
both a noncooperative and a cooperative points of view.
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events, such as the political business cycle. Since we are interested in long-term decisions
 secessions or uniÞcations  information gathered from surveys or opinion polls may
not be the most appropriate. Nevertheless, we do explore this type of information, and
Þnd a strong correlation between distances based on social surveys and genetic distances.
We view this result not as an argument for an extensive use of opinion polls, but rather
as lending support to the view that genetic distances are a reasonable proxy for cultural
distances.
Of course there exist alternatives for measuring cultural distances. For instance,
geographical distances or linguistic distances may capture the same type of information.
Indeed, the relation between genes, languages and geography has been extensively studied
in population genetics (see, e.g., Sokal (1987) and Cavalli-Sforza et al., (1994)). However,
even after controlling for languages and geography, we Þnd that populations that are
similar in genes tend to give more similar answers to opinion polls.3
Needless to say, our main assumption  more population mixing implies smaller
cultural differences  could be open to debate. Some authors claim that mixing is not
necessary for cultural diffusion to happen (see, e.g., Jobling et al., 2004). It might be
the case that, say, Danes have not mixed much with Germans in the last 20 generations,
so that there genetic distance is relatively large. However, cultural diffusion might have
taken place through books, newspapers, the education system, religion, etc., making their
preferences quite similar. Thus, the question is whether the transmission of culture takes
place through migration ßows and the mixing of populations (demic diffusion) or through
other channels. This is yet another debate in population genetics, and authors, such as
Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994) and Chikhi et al. (2002), have argued that demic diffusion
has played a dominant role.4 Spolaore and Wacziarg (2006) make a similar claim in the
case of the diffusion of innovation.
The issue of nation and alliance formation discussed in our paper has been empir-
3A recent paper by Giuliano et al. (2006) argues that in the case of trade genetic distances cease to
be signiÞcant once geographical distances are properly measured. In contrast, our focus is on cultural
distances, not on trade.
4See, however, Haak et al. (2005) for an opposite view regarding the diffusion of farming in Europe.
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ically studied by several authors. Axelrod and Bennett (1993) show how landscape theory
is able to predict the European alignment of the Second World War. They consider a
setting where each nation is characterized by its propensity to work with other nations.
Given the partition of all nations into two blocs, the frustration of a nation is determined
as the sum of its propensities towards nations outside the group, and energy is then
the weighted sum of the frustrations of all countries. Using the 1936 data, Axelrod and
Bennett examine two-bloc structures that minimize energy and show the existence of a
local minimum, which almost exactly corresponds to the wartime alignment in Europe.
Spolaore and Wacziarg (2005) estimate the effect of political borders on economic growth
and run a number of counterfactual experiments to examine how the union of different
country pairs would affects growth. However, they do not take into account cultural
heterogeneity. A recent paper of Alesina, Easterly and Matuszeski (2006) explores the
poor economic performance of artiÞcial states, where borders do not match a division
of nationalities.
From a theoretical point of view our paper is related to recent developments in
the area of hedonic games,5 where the payoff of a player depends exclusively upon the
group to which he belongs. In our framework the beneÞt of a region from being part of
a certain coalition depends solely on regions in the coalition, and is independent of the
number and composition of other coalitions that are formed. Thus, our nation formation
game is a hedonic game.6 Also, the contribution by Milchtaich and Winter (2002), where
players compare groups on the basis of the distance between their own characteristics and
the average characteristics of the group, share some common features with our work.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
framework. Section 3 studies the stability of Europe by exploring the likelihood of se-
cessions and unions between country pairs. Section 4 analyzes the gains of European
Union membership. Section 5 does an exhaustive study of the full stability of Europe.
5See Drèze and Greenberg (1980).
6However, our game is not additively separable which rules out the direct application of the results
by Banerjee, Konishi and Sönmez (2001) and Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002).
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Section 6 provides empirical support for using genetic distances as a proxy of cultural
heterogeneity. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 General Framework
The world W is partitioned into countries, each consisting of one or several regions.
Each individual in W resides in one of the regions. The set of regions is denoted by N .
In the rest of the discussion, the set of regions is taken as given, whereas the partition of
the world into countries can change. The population of country C is given by
p(C) =
X
I∈C
p(I),
where the summation extends over all regions I belonging to C.
There are two types of heterogeneity in this model, cultural and income. Within
regions there is only income heterogeneity. In other words, there is intra-regional income
heterogeneity, but no intra-regional cultural heterogeneity, so that individuals in a regions
may have different incomes but are culturally homogeneous. Within countries both types
of heterogeneity may be present. In other words, there is intra-country income hetero-
geneity, and if a country consists of more than one regions, there will also be intra-country
cultural heterogeneity.
For any two regions I, J ∈ N , we call d(I, J) the cultural distance between a
resident of I and a resident of J , and in the empirical part of our investigation we
identify d(I, J) with the genetic distance between region I and region J . Obviously,
d(I, J) = d(J, I) for all I and J . Given that cultural heterogeneity is only present
across regions, d(I, I) = 0 and d(I, J) > 0 for all I 6= J . We denote by D the matrix
D = (d(I, J))I,J∈N . The weighted cultural distance between a resident of region I, that
belongs to country C, and all other residents of C is
H(I,C) =
X
J∈C
p(J)d(I, J)
p(C)
. (1)
The value of H(I, C) will represent the degree of cultural heterogeneity experienced by a
resident of region I ∈ C.
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The income distribution in region I is given by the density function fI(y) with
support [y, y¯] which is common for all regions. The total income in I is denoted by Y (I):
Y (I) =
Z y¯
y
fI(y)dy. (2)
Similarly, Y (C) will denote the total income in country C.
Agents utility depends on private consumption, c, public consumption, g, and the
degree of cultural heterogeneity they face. We adopt the following quasi-linear expression
for the utility of an individual i in region I ∈ C:
u(c, g, I, C) = c+ V (g,H(I,C)), (3)
where V is twice continuously differentiable, strictly concave and increasing in the amount
of public good g. We assume that cultural heterogeneity reduces the utility an agent
derives from the consumption of the public good g. Thus, V is decreasing in the second
argument, the level of cultural heterogeneity faced by a resident of region I in country C.
If agents reside in one-region countries, intra-regional cultural homogeneity implies that
for every one-region country I the value of H(I, I) is equal to zero. Thus, the utility of
agents in one-region countries becomes:
u(c, g, I, I) = c+ V (g, 0).
Public goods are Þnanced through a proportional tax rate τ , 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1, so that
taxation is redistributive. For simplicity, we assume that the price of the public and the
private good are both equal to 1. Furthermore, taxation does not involve deadweight
losses, so that if country C selects the tax rate τ , the level of public good will be τY (C).
The indirect utility of an individual i with income yi, residing in region I in country C,
that adopts the tax rate τ , can be presented as
v(yi, τ , I, C) = yi(1− τ) + V (τY (C),H(I,C)). (4)
The tax rate τ in every country C is chosen by majority voting. Note that for
every country C the preferences of every agent i ∈ C over tax rates are single-peaked.
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Denote by τ(yi, I, C) the preferred tax rate for an individual i with income yi who resides
in region I ∈ C:
τ(yi, I, C) = arg max
τ∈[0,1]
v(yi, τ , I, C) (5)
Note that, given single-peaked preferences, majority voting yields a tax rate preferred by
the median agent.
The goal is to identify stable partitions of countries. There are several stability
concepts that have been applied in the literature (see, e.g., Alesina and Spolaore, 1997,
Jéhiel and Scotchmer, 2001, Bogomolnaia et al., 2005). In this paper, we focus on a simple
but relevant stability concept, which we believe to be the appropriate one in our context
(see also Alesina and Spolaore, 1997). We call this stability concept the Limited Right of
Map Redrawing and it requires, subject to majority voting, the unanimous approval of
any border redrawing by all affected regions. For every partition π = {C1, . . . , CK} and
every region I ∈ N denote by CI(π) the country in π that contains I. Let τ(C) be the
optimal tax level chosen by the median agent in country C. We then have the following
deÞnition:
Domination relation: Partition π0 dominates partition π if for every region affected by
the shift from π to π0, the majority of its residents prefer the new arrangement π0
over the old one π. That is, for every region I with CI(π) 6= CI(π0) we have
p({i ∈ I|v(yi, τ(CI(π0)), I, CI(π0)) > v(yi, τ(CI(π)), I, CI(π))}) > 1
2
p(I).
This concept of domination allows us to precisely deÞne the Limited Right of Map
Redrawing :
Limited Right of Map Redrawing (LRMR): Let partition π be given. A partition
π0 6= π generates credible map redrawing if π0 dominates π. A partition π is LRMR-
stable or stable if it cannot generate credible map redrawing.
It is crucial to point out the decisiveness of the median agent (Gans and Smart,
1996). That is, the preferences of the median income agent in a region over different
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arrangements represent those of the majority of its residents. For every region I denote
by ym(I) the median income in this region, and for every country C that contains I, let
vm(I,C) be the value of the indirect utility function v in (4) when the tax rate in country
C is given by τ(C):
vm(I, C) = v(ym(I), τ(C), I, C).
Then we have the following representation result:
Lemma - Median Decisiviness: For every region I and two different countries C and
C 0 with I ∈ CTC 0 we have
p({i ∈ I|v(yi, τ(C), I, C) > v(yi, τ(C 0), I, C 0)}) > 1
2
p(I)
if and only if
vm(I,C) > vm(I,C
0).
Proof: Consider a region I and two different countries C and C 0 such that
I ∈ CTC0. First, suppose that the inequality v(yi, τ(C), I, C) > v(yi, τ(C 0), I, C 0) holds
for more than half of region Is population. By (4), this inequality can be rewritten as
yi(τ(C
0)− τ(C)) > V (τY (C 0), H(I,C 0))− V (τY (C),H(I,C)). (6)
The range of yi that satisÞes (6) is an interval, and since it contains more than half of
region Is population, the interval must include the median agent ym(I), for whom (6)
should hold as well.
Assume now that vm(I, C) > vm(I,C 0). By (6), we have
ym(I)(τ(C
0)− τ(C)) > V (τY (C 0), H(I,C 0))− V (τY (C),H(I,C)). (7)
If τ(C 0) − τ(C) ≥ 0 then (7) holds for all yi > ym(I) and some yi < ym(I). If τ(C 0) −
τ(C) < 0 then (7) holds for all yi < ym(I) and some yi > ym(I). In both cases, more
than half of Is residents have the same preferences over C and C0 as the median agent
ym(I). Q.E.D.
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This lemma plays a crucial role in the proof of our existence result. Moreover, it
allows us to analyze a relation between stability and efficiency. Given the lemma, we focus
on a concept of efficiency that accounts for the utility achieved by agents with median
income in every region.
Efficiency: Let Π be a set of world partitions. We call π ∈ Π median-efficient if it
maximizes X
I∈N
vm(I, C
I(π))
over all world partitions π ∈ Π.
It turns out that it is always possible to Þnd a LRMR-stable partition. We show that,
in fact, every median-efficient partition is stable. One must note that the opposite is not
necessarily true.
Proposition: The set of LRMR-stable partitions and the set of median-efficient par-
titions are both nonempty. Moreover, every median-efficient partition is LRMR-
stable.
Proof: For every π ∈ Π denote
R(π) =
X
I∈N
vm(I, C
I(π)).
Then π is a median-efficient partition if and only if
R(π) = max
π0∈Π
R(π0).
Since Π is a Þnite set, there exists a median-efficient partition π. Let us show that it
is LRMR-stable. Indeed, if not, then there is a partition π0 that dominates π. Then a
median agent in every region affected by a shift from π to π0, would be better off at π0.
Since in regions that are not affected by a shift, there is no change in utility, we have
R(π0) > R(π), a contradiction to the median-efficiency of π. Q.E.D.
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2.2 Our SpeciÞcation
Before bringing our theoretical model to the data, we make some additional assumptions
on agents utilities. We adopt the following quasi-linear functional form for the utility of
an individual i in region I ∈ C:
u(c, g, I ∈ C) = c+ α(Z(I,C) g)β , (8)
where α > 0 and β > 0 are exogenously given parameters, and Z(I, C) is a discount
factor, whose range is between 0 and 1.
Since cultural heterogeneity reduces the utility an agent derives from the con-
sumption of the public good g, the value of Z(I,C) is negatively correlated with the
cultural heterogeneity faced by a resident of region I in country C. More speciÞcally, we
assume that for a such an agent the discount factor is given by
Z(I, C) = 1−H(I,C)δ, (9)
where δ ∈ [0, 1].
The parameter δ is important in two respects. First, the smaller is δ, the greater
is the cost of heterogeneity. If δ is very small, the value of Z(I, C) in a multi-regional
country is close to zero. In other words, a small δ implies that in such a country any
amount of public consumption becomes almost useless. Second, the smaller is δ, the more
convex is the discount factor Z. For small values of δ, the discount factor exhibits a high
degree of convexity, so that the relative effect of increasing heterogeneity on Z is larger
at lower levels of heterogeneity. If agents reside in one-region countries, the discount
factor Z(I, I) is equal to one, regardless of the value of δ. Thus, the utility of agents in
one-region countries becomes:
u(c, g) = c+ αgβ.
The indirect utility of an individual i with income yi, residing in region I ∈ C,
where the tax rate is τ , is
v(yi, τ , I, C) = yi(1− τ) + α (Z(I,C) τ Y (C))β. (10)
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We can now explicitly derive τ(yi, I, C), the preferred tax rate for an individual i with
income yi who resides in region I ∈ C. It is easy to see that the (interior) solution to (5)
is
τ(yi, I, C) =
µ
yi
α β (Z(I,C)Y (C))β
¶ 1
β−1
(11)
Notice that, in general, for I, J ∈ C we have Z(I,C) 6= Z(J,C) . In other words, the
cost of cultural heterogeneity tends to be different for agents living in different regions of
the same country. As a result, two individuals with the same income level, but residing
in different regions of country C, typically have different preferred tax rates. This implies
that the median agent in country C does not necessarily coincide with the agent with
the median income in C. This feature has important consequences for the empirical part
of the paper. Finding the preferred tax rate of a coalition of regions forming a country
becomes more laborious than just Þnding the preferred tax rate of the median income
agent. Of course, when a country is formed by only one region, this problem disappears,
and the agent with the median income becomes the decisive one in determining the tax
rate.
3 Stability of Europe
In this section we investigate whether we can Þnd values of parameters that render the
current map of Europe stable according to our Limited Right of Map Redrawing stability
concept. Using information on cultural distances between European regions and countries,
our goal is to Þnd values of α, β and δ that yield a LRMR-stable partition of Europe.
This exercise is of interest for a number of reasons. First, as a way of validating
our theoretical framework, it seems important that the set of parameter values consistent
with stability is not empty. Second, our analysis allows us to determine which regions are
more likely to separate, and which countries are more likely to form a union. For instance,
by increasing the cost associated with cultural heterogeneity, we can check which region
would be the Þrst one to secede. We can thus pinpoint the weak links in the current
map of Europe.
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3.1 Data
The most important data issue is to specify the matrix of cultural distances D. As already
mentioned, we use genetic distances between populations.7 The best-known reference is
Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994), who collected data from different sources to construct a ma-
trix of genetic distances for a large number of populations across the world.8 To carry out
our exercise, it is important to have information, not just on countries, but also on regions.
Indeed, to limit the range of δ from above and from below, it is not enough to make sure
that no existing countries want to unite, we also must guarantee that no existing regions
want to separate. The matrix of Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994) is therefore appropriate,
as it contains information on 22 European countries and 4 European regions (Basque
Country, Sardinia, Scotland and Lapland).9 Table A.1 in the Appendix reproduces the
matrix. Although it leaves out a number of relevant regions (Flanders, Catalonia, Brit-
tany, Northern Italy,...), the fact of having at least some regions is conceptually enough
to allow us to estimate δ.10
The other data we need are standard. Data on population and GDP per capita
(measured in PPP) are for the year 2000, and come from Eurostat, the Penn World Tables
and the International Monetary Fund. Data on income distribution come from the World
Income Inequality Database v.2.0a, collected by the United Nations University. Since
those data are not available for all years, we take the year which is closest to 2000. The
income distributions of regions are taken to be the same as those of the countries they
7See Hartl and Clark (1997) for an introduction to population genetics, and Jorde (1985) for a discus-
sion on the use of the different types of genetic distances to measure human population distances.
8The distances in Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994) are based on large sample sizes and use information
about many different genes. Most of the frequencies used to obtain those distances come from allozymes,
instead of from direct observation of the DNA sequence, a technique which is now available. However,
Cavalli-Sforza et al. (2003) argue that these new techniques and data do not change the basic results.
9Given the small population of Lapland, less than 100,000 and spread over three countries, we do not
use this region in our subsequent analysis. We also drop Yugoslavia, as that country disintegrated in the
1990s.
10One possibility would be to incorporate more recent data from other sources, such as the ALFRED
database, available at http://alfred.med.yale.edu/alfred/index.asp. However, merging the data would
require a laborious and complex effort. Since our goal is to illustrate how data on genetic distances can
be used to study issues of stability, we prefer to stick to the high quality data provided in Cavalli-Sforza
et al. (1994).
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belong to.
For those countries for which we have information on regions, we need to distin-
guish in the data between the country, the region, and the country net of the region. Take
the case of Spain. If the question is whether the Basque Country wants to separate, the
two relevant decision makers are the Basque Country and the rest of the Spain. However,
if the question is whether Spain wants to unite with Portugal, the two relevant decision
makers are Spain (including the Basque Country) and Portugal.
3.2 Estimation Strategy
Our strategy is to Þrst calibrate α and β using data on a set of European and OECD
countries, so that we are left with only one degree of freedom, the parameter δ. To cali-
brate α and β, we assume away cultural heterogeneity within countries.11 This amounts
to assuming that each country is made up by one region. In that case, the tax rate
adopted by country C is
τ(C) =
µ
ym(C)
α β (Y (C))β
¶ 1
β−1
(12)
where ym(C) is the median income in C. As can be seen from (12), we need data on
the tax rate, τ(C), median income, ym(C), and total income, Y (C). For the tax rate, we
take the ratio of government spending on public goods to total GDP. It is not entirely
obvious how to measure spending on public goods. To get as close as possible to what is a
public good, we want to focus on activities where congestion is limited. We use a number
of alternative measures. All data come from the Government Finance Statistics (GFS)
database, collected by the IMF. A Þrst measure takes the sum of general public services,
defense, public order and safety, environmental protection, and economic affairs. A second
measure takes only general public services. And a third measure focuses exclusively on
defense. As will be shown later, these alternative measures do not lead to qualitatively
different results. We use data for all European and OECD countries in the GFS database.
Depending on the measure used, we have information on 27 to 30 countries.
11As a robustness check, we re-estimate α and β for a subset of countries which are relatively homoge-
neous, and use those alternative estimates for our subsequent analysis. This does not change our results
qualitatively.
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To calibrate α and β, we estimate (12) by applying nonlinear least squares. The
results for each of the three measures of government spending are reported in Table 1.
Standard errors are given in brackets.
α β
General public services, defense -287 -0.0322
public order, environment (529) (0.0709)
economic affairs
General public services 25.80 0.0833
(26.79) (0.0627)
Defense -6.42 -0.1917
(3.27) (0.1625)
Table 1: Estimation of α and β
Using these measures of α and β, we now compute the range of δ for which
the current map of Europe is LRMR stable. In principle, checking for stability would
require us to analyze all possible partitions of the 21 countries and 3 regions we focus
on. However, the number of such partitions is too large (445,958,869,294,805,289). We
therefore limit our analysis to all possible separations (Basque Country-Spain, Scotland-
Britain, Sardinia-Italy) and all possible mergers between country pairs. In as far as large
unions start off small, focusing on unions between country pairs is not unrealistic.12
Using this setup, for Europe to be LRMR stable, two conditions need to be
satisÞed:
1. There is no unanimity between a region and the country it is part of to separate,
i.e., there is no majority in both the region and the country it belongs to in favor
of secession.
2. There is no unanimity between any pair of countries to unite, i.e., there is no
majority in each of the two countries to unite.
12We return to the issue of unions between more than two countries in Section 5.
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We start by analyzing the condition for no region to secede. Consider the three
regions in our database (Basque Country, Sardinia, and Scotland) and the three countries
they belong to (Spain, Italy, and Britain). For secession to occur, there needs to be a
majority in both affected parts. For instance, if the Basque Country is to separate, a
majority of Basques and a majority of the population in the rest of Spain should approve.
Therefore, in this context Spain is deÞned as Spain without the Basque Country, and
likewise for Italy and Britain. In the case secession does not occur, the agent with the
median income in region I ∈ C enjoys utility level
vm(I, C) = v(ym(I), τ(C), I, C),
If, instead, region I secedes, the utility of the agent with the median income becomes
vm(I, I) = v(ym(I), τ(I), I, I),
Under median representation region I prefers to remain part of country C if vm(I, C) ≥
vm(I, I). Since the utility of forming part of country C depends on the parameter δ, we
write the net gain of the union for the median income agent of region I as
gI,C(δ) ≡ vm(I, C)− vm(I, I) (13)
We now need to consider the same condition for the other affected part, i.e., the median
income agent of Spain without the Basque Country or of Britain without Scotland.
The net gain of the union for the median income agent of the rest of the country C/I can
be written as
gC/I,C(δ) ≡ vm(C/I, C)− vm(C/I,C/I) (14)
According to our deÞnition, for secession not to occur, it suffices that one of the
parts prefers to remain united. Thus, a Þrst necessary condition for the current European
partition to be stable is the existence of a nonempty set of the parameter δ for which at
least one of the functions (13) and (14) is positive for each of the pairs Basque Country-
Spain, Sardinia-Italy, and Scotland-Britain. The set of δ for which secession does not
occur can be deÞned as
SR ≡ {δ|max{gI,C(δ), gC/I,C(δ)} ≥ 0, for all I ∈ {Sardinia, Basque Country, Scotland}}
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The range of δ for which this condition holds for the relevant secessions in our data set
is obtained numerically.
We now analyze the condition for no country pairs to unite. To determine the
preferred tax rate in a possible union between, say, C and C 0, we need to identify the
median voter. Because the discount factor Z is not the same for all agents, this implies
that the median voter need not coincide with the median income agent of the union. To
solve this problem, we proceed in the following way. We compute the average income
of an agent in each decile of the income distribution for both countries C and C0. This,
together with data on population and income, allows us to determine for the union of
C and C0 the preferred tax rate of each one of these agents. In the case of the union
between two countries, this gives us 20 tax rates. Given that preferences over tax rates
are single peaked, we can Þnd the optimal tax rate for the decisive agent. This is done
by ordering the 20 tax rates mentioned above, and taking the one which corresponds to
half of the population of the union.
The net gain obtained by the median income agent in country C from joining
country C0 can be written as
gC,C0(δ) ≡ vm(C,C ∪ C0)− vm(C,C)
A second necessary condition for LRMR stability is that there is no pair of countries
C,C0 such that it is in the interest of both to join. In other words, there is no pair C,C 0
such that gC,C0(δ) > 0 and gC0,C(δ) > 0. The set of δ for which no two nations want to
unite can be deÞned as
SN ≡ {δ|min{gC,C0(δ), gC0,C(δ)} ≤ 0, for all C,C0]
Combining the necessary conditions for no secession and no union, a necessary
condition for LRMR stability is that the set
S ≡ SN ∩ SR
is non empty. It is clear that S is an interval on the real line, and we write S ≡ [δ, δ].
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3.3 Secessions and Unions between Country Pairs
To numerically compute whether there exists a range of δ that renders the current map
of Europe stable, we take the values of α and β estimated before. Taking government
spending to be the sum of general public services, defense, public order and safety, envi-
ronmental protection, and economic affairs, Table 1 gives us α = −282 and β = −0.0322.
Numerical computation then shows that S = [0.0285, 0.1575]. A Þrst conclusion is there-
fore that the set S is nonempty. This result is robust to the alternative deÞnitions of
government spending of Table 1.
We can now look at which regions are more likely to secede, and which country
pairs are more likely to unite. To understand how this can be done, note that if δ < 0.0285,
cultural distances are given so much weight, that we cannot prevent certain regions to
break away. By progressively lowering δ, we can then rank regions, depending on the risk
they pose to the union. Likewise, if δ > 0.1575, the weight put on cultural distances is
not enough to prevent some currently independent nations from uniting. By progressively
increasing δ, we can rank country pairs, depending on how likely they are to unite.
Table 2 focuses on the likelihood of secessions. As can be seen, the Basque Country
is the more likely one to break away, followed by Scotland and Sardinia. This ranking is
unchanged under a number of robustness checks.13
1 Basque Country
2 Scotland
3 Sardinia
Table 2: Likelihood of secession
Table 3 focuses on the likelihood of unions between country pairs. The Þrst
column consists of the benchmark case. Austria and Belgium are the two countries most
likely to unite: both are small, have similar populations, and similar levels of GDP per
capita. According to the Cavalli-Sforza matrix, they are also genetically close. Remember
13 In particular, we used the two alternative deÞnitions of government spending of Table 1. In addition,
we also checked for α plus or minus its standard error, and β plus or minus its standard error.
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that present-day Belgium became part of Austria with the Treaty of Utrecht (1713),
following the Spanish War of Succession, and remained under Habsburg rule until the
French invasion of 1794. The next pairs which stand to gain most from uniÞcation 
Switzerland-Belgium, Denmark-Norway, Austria-Switzerland, and Belgium-Netherlands
 Þt the same pattern: small countries, similar levels of GDP per capita, and genetically
close. Again, the presence of Belgium in many of these pairs is not surprising: on the
border between Latin and Germanic Europe since Roman times, and serving as the
battleÞeld of Europe, it is the genetic capital of Europe. The ranking shows that
unions between large and small countries are unlikely. This makes sense: the larger
country would Þnd little Þscal beneÞt to such unions. There is one exception though:
Poland-Belgium. Since the larger country of the two, Poland, is also the poorer one,
this union still has the potential of being mutually beneÞcial. Likewise, unions between
two large nations are not common, as on their own they already beneÞt from substantial
increasing returns in the provision of public goods. The only two such unions in the
top-10 occupy the last two positions: Germany-Britain and France-Germany.
Benchmark Geographically Same population
contiguous
1 Austria-Belgium Denmark-Norway Denmark-Netherlands
2 Switzerland-Belgium Austria-Switzerland Austria-Switzerland
3 Denmark-Norway Belgium-Netherlands Belgium-Netherlands
4 Austria-Switzerland Norway-Sweden Germany-Switzerland
5 Belgium-Netherlands Germany-France Germany-Belgium
6 Belgium-Poland France-Britain Belgium-Britain
7 Switzerland-Denmark Czech Republic - Hungary Switzerland-Belgium
8 Norway-Sweden France-Italy Switzerland-Netherlands
9 Germany-Britain Denmark-Sweden Germany-Netherlands
10 France-Germany Netherlands-Britain Austria-Belgium
Table 3: Likelihood of unions
The second column in Table 3 restricts possible unions to country pairs that are
geographical neighbors.14 In that case, Denmark and Norway are the two countries most
14 In the case of islands, such as Britain, or peninsulas, such as Denmark, we interpret this as countries
which are geographically close.
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likely to unite. They are followed by Austria-Switzerland, Belgium-Netherlands, and
Norway-Sweden. Three out of these Þrst four pairs were united for parts of their history.
Norway formed part of the Danish crown from the Middle Ages until 1814. Belgium and
the Netherlands were united under Burgundy, Habsburg and Spain from 1384 to 1581,
and brießy again after the Treaty of Waterloo, from 1815 to 1830. Sweden and Norway
were united under the same crown from 1814 to 1905, and for a brief spell in the 14th
century.
The third column in Table 3 runs a counterfactual by assuming that all countries
have the same population of 26 million, corresponding to the average of the countries in
our data set. When abstracting from different population sizes, the most likely union is
between Denmark and the Netherlands. In fact, the genetic distance between the two is
the smallest one in the Cavalli-Sforza matrix. Relations between both countries became
strong during the Eighty Years War between the Netherlands and Spain in the 16th-17th
century, when a large number of Dutch migrated to Denmark, turning the Netherlands
into one of the most important export markets for Denmark. When ignoring differences
in population sizes, unions between, for instance, Germany and Switzerland, or Germany
and Belgium, become increasingly likely. This suggests that the most important obstacle
to a union between, say, Germany and Switzerland, is their different sizes. Other unions,
such as between Belgium and Poland, now become less likely. Indeed, what made Poland
attractive to Belgium in the benchmark case was its large size.
As a robustness check, Table 4 uses alternative deÞnitions of government spending.
The Þrst column takes general public services to be the measure of public spending. Using
the corresponding α and β from Table 1, we re-estimate which countries are most likely
to unite. The second column follows the same procedure, using defense as the measure of
public spending. As can be seen, in both cases, the results are similar to the benchmark
case. In fact, the Þve most likely unions do not change. Further robustness checks on α
and β do not change the results. In particular, when we take β plus or minus its standard
error, and re-optimize the value of α, the Þve most likely unions do not vary. The same
result obtains when taking α plus or minus its standard error.
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General Defense
public services
1 Austria-Belgium Austria-Belgium
2 Switzerland-Belgium Switzerland-Belgium
3 Denmark-Norway Denmark-Norway
4 Austria-Switzerland Austria-Switzerland
5 Belgium-Netherlands Belgium-Netherlands
6 Switzerland-Denmark Switzerland-Denmark
7 Norway-Sweden Poland-Belgium
8 Germany-Britain Norway-Sweden
9 Poland-Belgium Germany-Britain
10 France-Germany France-Germany
Table 4: Likelihood of unions, using alternative deÞnitions of public spending
4 The Gains of European Union Membership
In this section we use our model to estimate the gains of being a member of the EU-15.
Our goal is two-fold. First, we want to see which countries gain most and which lose
most from being part of the European Union. Second, we would like to understand how
taking into account cultural distances affects the ranking of those gains.
The idea is to view the European Union as a new country formed by the merger
of previously independent nations. We can then compare the utility of being inside or
outside the EU. In terms of data, we focus on the 14 member states of the EU-15 for
which we have information.15 If country C is part of the European Union, the utility of
its median income agent is vm(C,EU), where EU is the set of members of the European
Union. Country Cs relative gain from becoming part of the EU is:
gC,EU (δ) ≡ vm(C,EU)− vm(C,C)
vm(C,C)
The relative gains of being part of the European Union depends on the value of δ.
Assuming the current map of Europe is stable, our previous estimations indicate that δ
belongs to the set S = [0.0285, 0.1575]. Since it is not obvious which value of δ to choose
within that range, we assume that all the elements of S are equally likely. To compute
15Data on cultural distances are missing for Luxembourg.
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the relative welfare gain of being a member of the EU, we therefore take the average of
gC,EU (δ) over all the parameters in S, namely
gC,EU ≡
Z
S
gC,EU (δ)dF (15)
where F is the uniform distribution over the interval S. We take an approximation bgC,EU
by computing
bgC,EU ≡ 1000X
i=0
gC,EU (δ +
δ − δ
1000
i) (16)
Table 5 reports the ranking of relative utility gains of the different member states
of the EU-15.16 According to our computations, Ireland is the country that gains most,
followed by Denmark. Germany is the only country that loses from EU membership,
although the gains in the larger countries  Italy, Britain, France and Spain  are
relatively small.
Country Population Cultural GDP
distance per capita
1 Ireland 3.8 0.095 126
2 Denmark 5.3 0.045 126
3 Finland 5.1 0.105 113
4 Portugal 10 0.051 80
5 Austria 8.1 0.043 126
6 Belgium 10.2 0.027 117
7 Sweden 8.87 0.067 119
8 Greece 10.6 0.142 73
9 Netherlands 15.9 0.041 120
10 Spain 40.3 0.056 92
11 France 59 0.032 114
12 Britain 58.6 0.034 112
13 Italy 56.9 0.042 113
14 Germany (-) 82 0.031 112
Table 5: Ranking of relative utility gains from being member of EU
Different variables  population size, GDP per capita, income distribution, and
cultural heterogeneity  affect this ranking. Table 5 seems to suggest a strong corre-
lation between population size and relative gains. However, population cannot be the
16We limit ourselves to reporting the ranking, and not the relative utility gain for each country, as this
measure is not meaningful.
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entire explanation. Greece, Belgium and Portugal, for instance, all have a population
size of around 10 million, but Greece gains less than Belgium, and Belgium gains less
than Portugal. The difference between Belgium and Portugal can be attributed to GDP
per capita. Richer countries are forced to redistribute more, and may therefore be less
interested in uniting. However, this does not explain the difference between Belgium
and Greece. This is where cultural distances come in: Belgium is the least distant from
the average European country, whereas Greece is the most distant. This explains why
Greece, in spite of being nearly 40% poorer than Belgium, gains less from membership in
the EU.
Country Change
ranking
Ireland 0
Finland 1
Denmark -1
Greece 4
Portugal -1
Austria -1
Sweden 0
Belgium -2
Netherlands 0
Spain 0
Italy 2
Britain 0
France -2
Germany (-) 0
Table 6: Relative utility gains of being member of EU (no cultural distances)
To understand the role of cultural distances, we recompute the gains from being
part of the EU, setting all distances between all countries to zero. The results are reported
in Table 6. As expected, Greece now gains more than Belgium. When abstracting from
cultural distances, Greece goes up 4 ranks and Belgium goes down 2 ranks. France also
swaps places with Italy. Given that France is culturally closer to the European average,
it gains less than Italy if we do not take into account culture.
Rather than focusing on relative utility gains, one can compute a ranking based
on monetary gains. We do so by calculating the relative increase in per capita income,
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r, all agents in country C should receive to render its median agent indifferent between
joining the EU (and not receiving the additional income rym(C)) and remaining outside
the EU (and receiving rym(C)). The relative increase (decrease) in income is a measure
of the relative monetary gains (losses) from being part of the EU. To determine r for each
nation C we solve the following equation:
ym(C)(1 + r)(1− τ 0(C)) + α(τ 0(C)Y (C)(1 + r))β (17)
= ym(C)(1− τ(EU)) + α(Z(C,EU)τ (EU)Y (EU))β
where τ 0(C) is the optimal tax rate for the median income agent of country C, given that
everyones income in C is multiplied by (1 + r).
Country Monetary Population Cultural GDP Ranking
gain (%) distance per capita (no distance)
Portugal 25.93 10 0.051 80 -1
Greece 22.39 10.6 0.142 73 1
Ireland 18.96 3.8 0.095 126 0
Finland 16.79 5.1 0.105 113 0
Denmark 16.12 5.3 0.045 126 0
Belgium 14.43 10.2 0.027 117 -2
Austria 14.21 8.1 0.043 126 0
Sweden 12.89 8.87 0.067 119 2
Netherlands 10.82 15.9 0.041 120 -1
Spain 4.84 40.3 0.056 92 1
France 0.79 59 0.032 114 -2
Britain 0.61 58.6 0.034 112 0
Italy 0.52 56.9 0.042 113 2
Germany -1.76 82 0.031 112 0
Table 7: Relative monetary gain from being member of EU
Table 7 reports the relative increase in income that leaves the decisive agent in
each country indifferent between joining or not joining the EU-15. The ranking we obtain
is similar to the one based on utility. Germany is the only country that loses (nearly 2% of
income), whereas Portugal is the one that gains most (about 26% of income). There are
some differences though. Greece now gains more than Belgium, although it still gains less
than Portugal, in spite of being poorer. This is no longer the case when abstracting from
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cultural differences. This can be seen in the last column of Table 7. Greece moves up one
position, and Portugal moves down one, so that Greece becomes the country that gains
most from EU membership, ahead of Portugal. When not taking into account cultural
differences, Spain now beneÞts more than the Netherlands, in spite of its larger size.
5 Full Stability
In Section 3 we argued that an exhaustive study of LRMR stability for Europe exceeds our
computing capacity. Indeed, for the 21 countries and 3 regions in our data set, this would
amount to checking 445,958,869,294,805,289 possible partitions. Moreover, determining
who is the agent with the median optimal tax rate in each partition is laborious, because
cultural heterogeneity implies that the decisive agent need not coincide with the median
income agent. This is one reason for why in Section 3 we limited ourselves to unions of
two countries. The other reason is that in a dynamic framework, where larger unions
between many countries start off as smaller unions between a few, focusing on country
pairs is of interest per se.
In this section we revisit the problem of full stability. By introducing two restric-
tions, we are able to check for all possible partitions. First, instead of looking at all of
Europe, we focus on the EU-15, and leave out the peripheral countries Ireland, Finland
and Sweden. Given that we do not have data on Luxembourg, this leaves us with 11
countries, and only 678,570 possible partitions. Second, we assume that in each country
the level of the public good is chosen to maximize the total utility of its residents. It
is easy to see that maximizing total utility in a nation is equivalent to maximizing the
population-weighted average of the utility of the mean income residents of the different
regions. In that case, the tax rate adopted in country C is the solution to
τ(C) = arg max
τ∈[0,1]
X
I∈C
p(I)v(y(I), τ , I, C) (18)
where y(I) is the mean income in region I. One can easily show that the solution to (18)
is given by
τ(C) =
µ
1
α β
P
I∈C p(I) (Z(I,C))β
¶ 1
β−1 1
Y (C)
(19)
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To compute the tax rate (19), we only need information on population, total GDP and
cultural distances. We no longer need to determine who is the median agent for each
possible partition. As a result, computing welfare for each of the 678,570 partitions
becomes a computationally feasible task.
One can easily deÞne LRMR stability when the decisive agent is the mean income
agent, by changing the majority of its residents in the deÞnition of Domination Rela-
tion by the mean income agent. In this case, the corresponding deÞnition of efficiency
should be mean-efficiency, rather than median-efficiency, and a similar result as the one
in Proposition 1 holds.
Be that as it may, we want to emphasize that we adopted this approach with the
sole goal of simplifying the problem computationally. From a theoretical point of view,
this simpliÞcation may come at a cost. However, from an empirical point of view it turns
out that this mean agent framework is a good proxy of the previous approach. To
reach this conclusion, we repeated our exercises in Section 3 and 4, using a mean agent
rather than a median agent framework, and found that none of the results changed.
We therefore feel conÞdent that adopting this simpliÞcation does not come at the cost of
losing realism. Our empirical results would likely be very similar if were able to do the
exercise using a median voter framework.
We compute total welfare for each of the 678, 570 partitions and select the parti-
tion that yields the maximum. The result depends, obviously, on the chosen value of the
parameter δ. We Þnd that, at an accuracy level of 0.00001, there exists a critical value
of δ∗ = 0.04066, such that for δ < δ∗ the current partition of Europe maximizes total
welfare, and therefore is efficient and LRMR-stable, whereas for δ > δ∗ the union of all
countries maximizes total welfare, so that the EU would be efficient and LRMR-stable.
In other words, the only two efficient partitions of Europe is either full integration or full
independence.
This result is subject to two caveats. First, the absence of intermediate conÞgura-
tions is not a general feature of the model. One can easily generate examples for subsets
of the countries analyzed in this paper for which the efficient partition implies the union
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of some, but not all, countries. For example, in the case of Sweden, Denmark and Greece
for values of δ ∈ [0.18, 0.21] the efficient partition consists of the union of only Denmark
and Sweden. Second, in our model we do not impose any restrictions on how unions
are formed. Even if a union between all countries is the efficient outcome, whether a
full union is reached or not would depend on the dynamics of how unions are formed.
The literature on whether preferential trade agreements are building blocks or stumbling
blocks to global free trade may be of interest here.
6 Genetic and Cultural Distances
In this section we provide some formal defense of our choice to use genetic distances as
a proxy for cultural distances among populations. The question we ask is Are genetic
distances correlated to cultural distances? We propose the following strategy to answer
this question: we compare the matrix of genetic distances from Cavalli-Sforza et al.
(1994) to the answers given in the World Values Survey (WVS) to questions on cultural
values. In particular, we take the 430 questions included in the sections on Perceptions
of Life, Family and Religion and Moral from the four waves currently available online at
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/.
We use these questions from the WVS to calculate cultural distances among our
14 European nations. Each question has q different possible answers and we denote
by xi,j = ( x1i,j , x
2
i,j, ...x
q
i,j) the vector of relative answers to question i in nation j .
For example, suppose that question i has three possible answers, a, b and c. The vector
xi,j = (1/2, 0, 1/2) indicates that in nation j, half of the people answer a, and the other
half c.We construct a matrix of opinion poll distances between the nations such that the
(j, k) element of the matrix represents the average Manhattan distance between nation j
and nation k and is given by
wjk =
430X
i=1
qX
s=1
¯¯
xsi,j − xsi,k
¯¯
(20)
We denote the resulting matrix by W , and it is reported in Table A.2 in the Appendix.
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Figure 1: Genetic Distance and World Values Survey Distance
All our results are robust to the use of the Euclidean distance instead of the Manhattan
distance in (20).
6.1 Descriptive Statistics
We want to see whether matrix W is correlated with the matrix of genetic distances D.
The goal is to study whether countries that are genetically close give similar answers to
the questions in the World Values Survey. Figure 1 shows a scatter plot to better visualize
such possible correlation. The y-axis represents WVS distances and the x-axis genetic
distances. Say that the genetic distance from nation i to nation j is x and the WVS
distance is y, then in the plot there is a corresponding point with coordinates (x,y).
Thus, the x-coordinate of a point in the plot comes from the coefficient in matrix D and
the y-coordinate comes from the corresponding coefficient in matrix W . As can be seen,
Figure 1 suggests a strong correlation between WVS and genetic distances.
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6.2 A More Formal Test
Since the elements of a distance matrix are not independent17 we cannot use standard
methods of least square estimation to test for (linear) correlation between the matrices
D and W . A method often used in Population Genetics is the Mantel Test which is a
nonparametric randomization procedure.18
Mantels test statistic is the correlation coefficient, r, of the distance matrices
D and W . The signiÞcance of the correlation is evaluated via random permutation of
the rows and corresponding columns of D and W . For each random permutation, the
correlation r is computed. After a sufficient number of iterations, the distribution of
values of r is generated and the critical value of the test at the chosen level of signiÞcance
is found from this distribution. In our case, the correlation coefficient between matrices
D and W is 0.64 and the hypothesis of non-positive correlation is strongly rejected based
on a Mantel test with 100, 000 replications (p-value of 0.00014). This highly signiÞcant
correlation provides a foundation for the use of the matrix of genetic distances as a proxy
for the cultural heterogeneity among European countries.
If the defense for using matrix D is based on its correlation with the matrix of
distances W , one might claim that it would be better to directly use W for our analysis.
However, the matrix W is based on opinion polls, and although we focus on questions
related to peoples long term preferences, their answers may still be distorted by short
term events. In that sense, we are interested in analyzing the correlation between W and
D, not because W is an unbiased measure of the true cultural distances, but because
a lack of positive correlation would raise doubts about using D as a proxy for those
unknown cultural distances.
An additional criticism might be that there are better proxies for the cultural
distances than the genetic distances among populations. A natural alternative to our
matrix D could be the matrix of geographical distances between countries. Thus, we
17This is due to the triangle inequality property.
18See Mantel (1967), Sokal and Rohlf (1995), and Legendre and Legendre (1998). For the use of the
Mantel test in economics, see Collado et al. (2005).
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compute a matrix G of geographical distances among our European countries.19 Since
we do not observe the true matrix of cultural distances there is no fully satisfactory way
to assess which matrix, either D or G, is a better proxy. However, it is possible to test
whether genetic distances are more than just a proxy for geographic distances. In other
words, it might be the case that once we control for geography, the matrix of genetic
distances G is no longer correlated with the matrix W .
In order to investigate this possibility we perform a multiple variable Mantel test
to determine the signiÞcance of the correlation coefficient of the D and W matrices,
controlling for G.20 The correlation is now 0.32, signiÞcantly greater than zero (p-value
of 0.02). Thus, after controlling for how geographically close populations are, we still
Þnd that populations that are similar in genes tend to be similar in their answers to the
opinion polls.
The amount of mixing between populations might also be inßuenced by the lan-
guages spoken by them. One would expect that two populations with the same language
have experienced more mixing than populations speaking quite unrelated languages. We
therefore study whether the correlation between genetic distances and cultural distances
still holds after controlling for both linguistic and geographic distances. To do so, we con-
struct a matrix L of linguistic distances between all our populations.21 We then perform
a second multiple variable Mantel test to determine the signiÞcance of the correlation co-
efficient of the D and W matrices, controlling for G and L. The correlation is now 0.28,
still signiÞcantly greater than zero (p-value of 0.04). To understand what this means,
19Geographic distances were calculated as the crow ßies, and the coordinates of each region were
obtained from Simoni et al. (2000). This matrix and all the other matrices calculated in the paper, as
well as the software programs used for the computation of correlation tests, are available from the authors
upon request.
20To do so, we follow Smouse et al. (1986) who extend the Mantel bivariate test to the context of
multiple control variables.
21Our measure of distance between languages is based on the proportion of cognates between Indo-
European languages elaborated by Dyen, Kruskal and Black (1992). See Ginsburgh et al (2005) and
Desmet et. al (2005) for an application of these distances to economics. The linguistic distances between
populations are calculated using the information from the Ethnologue Project on the number of people
speaking each language in each country. We set the distance between Finland and any other country to 1,
the maximum possible distance. The matrix L of linguistic distances, and the details of its construction,
are available form the authors upon request.
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consider the following example. Say country i is geographically equidistant from j and
k, and the same language is spoken in j and k. In that case country i will be closer to
country j than to country k in the answers given to the WVS if the genetic distance
between i and j is smaller than between i and k.22
The signiÞcant positive correlation between genetic distances and World Values
Survey distances therefore holds up, even when controlling for geographic and linguistic
distances. To the best of our knowledge, this is the Þrst time a clear correlation between
genetic distances and modern cultural distances has been reported in the literature. This
result provides an argument in favor of using genetic distances as a proxy for cultural
distances between populations.
7 Further Research
By using data on cultural distances between regions and nations, this paper has empir-
ically explored the stability of Europe. There are at least three main areas for future
research. First, integration and cooperation between regions and countries may take
many different forms. Regions may have high degrees of autonomy, without fully se-
ceding. Countries may closely cooperate, without fully uniting. By incorporating those
possibilities into the theoretical framework, one could empirically study the degree of
decentralization and cooperation. Second, certain recent events, such as the breakup of
the Soviet Union or the enlargement of the EU, can be analyzed within the framework
we propose. Third, the dynamics of nation formation warrants further attention. Large
coalitions, such as the present day EU, started off being much smaller. Since there is
likely to be path-dependence in coalition formation, understanding these dynamics is
important.
22Performing an alternative multiple variable Mantel test to determine the signiÞcance of the correlation
between W and G, controlling for D and L, gives a positive but less signiÞcant correlation, p-value=0.10.
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Bas Sa Au Fr Ge Be Dk Ne En Ire Nor Sc Sw Gr It P Sp Fi
Basque 0
Sardinia 261 0
Austria 195 294 0
France 93 283 38 0
Germany 169 331 19 27 0
Belgium 107 256 16 32 15 0
Denmark 184 348 27 43 16 21 0
Netherlands 118 307 38 32 16 12 9 0
England 119 340 55 24 22 15 21 17 0
Ireland 145 393 115 93 84 75 68 76 30 0
Norway 195 424 61 56 21 24 19 21 25 79 0
Scotland 146 357 74 62 53 59 40 48 27 29 58 0
Sweden 168 371 80 78 39 34 36 41 37 94 18 74 0
G reece 231 190 86 131 144 103 191 199 204 289 235 253 230 0
Italy 141 221 43 34 38 30 72 64 51 132 88 112 95 77 0
Portugal 145 340 48 48 51 31 77 60 46 115 73 97 78 103 44 0
Spain 104 295 69 39 69 42 80 76 47 113 97 100 99 162 61 48 0
F inland 236 334 77 107 77 63 96 123 115 223 94 166 82 150 94 119 159 0
Table A.1: Matrix of Genetic Distances (from Cavalli-Sforza et. al.)
Au Fr Ge Be Dk Ne En Ire Sw Gr It P Sp Fi
Austria 0
France 28 0
Germany 19 27 0
Belgium 20 16 23 0
Denmark 34 26 31 27 0
Netherlands 30 25 27 21 26 0
England 25 22 25 20 27 22 0
Ireland 31 32 38 26 36 31 22 0
Sweden 30 26 27 26 22 23 24 34 0
G reece 27 32 32 29 41 38 28 32 37 0
Italy 23 24 28 22 34 29 22 23 32 24 0
Portugal 23 29 28 25 41 37 27 28 38 28 18 0
Spain 24 22 26 19 32 26 22 24 32 30 19 21 0
F inland 27 34 27 30 34 31 26 37 28 30 32 32 32 0
Table A.2: Cultural distances (World Values Survey)
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